Abstracts & Papers in Stream 2

The so-called 'welfare modelling business' has been at the heart of comparative social policy analysis since the publication of Esping-Andersen's classic The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Debate has advanced considerably since the emergence of this text, be it in terms of expanding the range of countries considered, expanding the scope of policy areas and issues encompassed in typologies or in linking welfare types to both the contextual factors shaping welfare systems and the varying outcomes that social policies seek to address.

However, debate to date has largely proceeded on the basis that coherent nation states exist even in what many view to be an era of globalisation. This assumption was always problematic - as many theorists have acknowledged - but globalisation processes have added a further dimension to this debate. In particular, geographer and sociologists have pointed to the increasing power of global cities that act as co-ordinating hubs for the global economy. Though residing in nation states, these cities have a special status flowing from their central role in the global economy. While theorists have highlighted the social tensions that often exist in these cities themselves, there has been no systematic attempt to explore the implications of these cities for welfare regimes and welfare regime analysis. This paper addresses this under explored issues and argues that an analysis of global cities can not only better inform our understanding of globalisation processes but may also be significant in understanding the development of differing welfare types too.

Japan is one of the most problematic cases to put it in appropriate place under the classification of welfare regime and its trait of familial welfarism has not been explained well partly because welfare researchers have preferred the political economic approach to the gender and family study. However, the family occupies very unique position in the welfare regime as it is not only the welfare producer but also the welfare recipient. This paper argues that Japanese welfare regime presupposed the modified extended family, which is sort of a nuclear family but functioning as the extended family, and therefore, generational relation as well as gender relation was fundamental inside the family. Post-war western welfare state presumed the nuclear family as a standard family form and the intergenerational support was partly socialized through pay-as-you-go pension system. On the other hand, Japanese government put emphasis on three-generational cohabitation as a welfare asset. Especially it was salient in the 'Japanese welfare society' policy framework. Differently from the conventional wisdom of the extended family being Japanese tradition, the modified extended family form was created and reinforced by the government. Along with the weakening of the patriarchal norm of extended family, the trade-off relationship of inheritance and care became increasingly important between parents and their offspring's household. And therefore, the government was forced to offer diverse tax incentives for the inheritance and the care in order to encourage the intergenerational support. This policy response led to at least two results. Firstly, Japanese household preferred the asset-holding both for the income security and for the inheritance. And it was mainly done by the home ownership. Secondly, women were tied up as part-timer to take the tremendous burden of family welfare. Japanese welfare regime could have been attacked by Japanese women as it was no longer gender-friendly. But it was not the case. Rather, Japanese household preferred the private 'exit' to the public 'voice' strategy. They struggled to hold much more asset such as home ownership and financial saving in the era of welfare transformation (or retrenchment) and it seems like very path-dependent event seeing from the historical perspective of familial welfare regime in Japan.

 

Full paper: Kim_DoKyun_2010_'Hybrid or unique' revisited.pdf

In the recent discussion of the East-Asian welfare capitalism, there rises the debate on the continuity (or discontinuity) of the East-Asian welfare system. The debate centers on if the East-Asian welfare system is still characteristic with the productivist welfare capitalism. The productivist welfare system signifies that the economic policy is subordinate to the economic policy and the degree of decommdification is comparatively low. Considering the function of political stability for the authoritarianism regime, the target groups of the benefits recipients are narrowed only within core workers in the strategic industries (and branches), the public servicemen and the military.
By the process of democratization, the rule of game has been changed. Whereas the political imperative under authoritarianism regime is economic growth, it has been changed into the capacity for responding demands to the electorates under partisan competition. This change of game offers an opportunity for welfare expansion. This process of welfare expansion denotes the following characteristics. The welfare recipients are potentially extended to cover less advantaged groups, such as atypical workers and unskilled workers. Other economic vulnerable groups should also be considered such as housewife, children, disabled and aged people. A question remains, to what extend and in which way these less advantaged groups will be included into the public welfare system.
The above question refers to the core problematic of the social policy institutional design. Based on theoretical consideration addressed by the seminal work of Baldwin (1990) under the label of ''The Politics of Solidarity", I try to analyze the process of welfare expansion in the two new democracies in East Asia: South-Korea and Taiwan. It will be argues that the centralism has been successfully established in public health insurance scheme. However, the pension system still follows the path of fragementalism and unemployment insurance. The divergence of this two systems denotes a transition of productivist welfare system.

Following the consideration suggested by Nita Rudra (2007), this paper aims to analyze the internal mechanism for intermediating external pressures and social policy schemes. Using a cluster statistical analysis, Rudra found that there exists at least three types of welfare capitalism in the late developing countries: protective welfare state, protective welfare state and the mixed form. For explaining the divergence between protective and productive welfare states in the LDCs, it is suggested that the interaction mechanism between developmental strategies, welfare regime type, distributional coalition and path dependence should be clarified. Furthermore, as the analytical insight of historical institutionalism shows, the initial established institution will create the invested interests in its inner core. This 'lock-in' effect explains why some institutions can persist and be stable across time. Rudra proposes, for analyzing the political dynamics within the productive welfare state, the strategic interaction between state elites and the owners of domestic and foreign capital should be crucial for explaining the productive welfare regime type.

This approach emphasizes on the interaction between developmental strategies and domestic distribution coalition. Under which circumstances will a country develop economic policy to join the international market? How does the policy induce the formation of a production and distributional coalition? How this coalition shapes the type of welfare system? Which actors are included in the coalition and who gains from the interest constellation (who loses from that)? How will this constellation be changed by through 'critical juncture', e.g. democratization.